A federal appeals court has placed a substantial roadblock in front of employers seeking to stop National Labor Relations Board proceedings before those proceedings run their course. In Spring Creek Rehabilitation and Nursing Center LLC v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived a federal district court of jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction.

The decision matters well beyond one New Jersey nursing facility. Employers across the country have increasingly challenged the NLRB’s structure, arguing that Board members and administrative law judges are protected from presidential removal in ways that violate Article II of the Constitution. Some businesses have asked federal courts to halt pending unfair labor practice cases while those constitutional questions are litigated.

The Third Circuit’s answer was essentially: not so fast. Although the constitutional issues may be important, the court concluded that an employer cannot escape the Norris-LaGuardia Act simply by placing a constitutional label on a lawsuit that arose from an underlying labor dispute. That conclusion conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s approach and contributes to a growing disagreement among federal courts.

How the Spring Creek Dispute Began

Spring Creek Rehabilitation and Nursing Center purchased a skilled nursing facility from Amboy Nursing and Rehabilitation Center in November 2021. Before the sale, Amboy had maintained a collective bargaining relationship with 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East, which represented employees at the facility.

The most recent collective bargaining agreement between Amboy and the union took effect in 2017 and expired in 2020. After acquiring the facility, Spring Creek informed the union that it would not assume the expired agreement. The union later added Spring Creek to an unfair labor practice charge pending before the NLRB.

In May 2024, the NLRB issued a complaint against Spring Creek and amended it approximately two months later. The agency alleged that the company had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the employees’ representative.

The Board scheduled a hearing before an administrative law judge, commonly called an ALJ. Rather than waiting for that process to produce a final order, Spring Creek filed a separate lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.

The Employer’s Constitutional Argument

Spring Creek argued that NLRB administrative law judges were unconstitutionally insulated from removal by the president. ALJs generally receive layers of statutory employment protection intended to preserve their independence. Spring Creek contended that those safeguards improperly restricted presidential control over executive officers.

The company requested a preliminary injunction that would stop the administrative proceeding. In practical terms, it wanted the federal court to pull the emergency brake before the NLRB hearing moved any farther down the track.

The district court denied the request. It found that Spring Creek had not demonstrated irreparable harm, one of the essential requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. The NLRB hearing subsequently occurred, although no administrative decision had been issued when the Third Circuit considered the appeal.

The Third Circuit Focused on Jurisdiction

On appeal, the NLRB raised an argument that it had not presented in the district court: the Norris-LaGuardia Act stripped the court of jurisdiction to grant the requested injunction. Because subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s legal power to decide a dispute, the issue could be considered even though it was raised late.

The Third Circuit did not decide whether the NLRB’s removal protections were constitutional. It also did not resolve the case by balancing the usual preliminary-injunction factors. Instead, the majority decided the case at the courthouse door.

Under Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to issue restraining orders or injunctions in cases “involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” except under narrowly defined conditions. Congress enacted the law in 1932 after federal judges had frequently used injunctions to intervene in strikes, picketing, organizing campaigns, and other conflicts between labor and management.

A Broad Definition of Labor Dispute

The statute defines a labor dispute broadly. It includes controversies over employment terms and conditions, as well as disputes concerning employee representation and collective bargaining. Courts have traditionally examined whether the employer-employee relationship forms the central framework of the controversy.

Spring Creek emphasized that its federal lawsuit concerned constitutional structure, not wages, hours, benefits, or bargaining proposals. The company was not asking the district court to determine whether it had actually committed an unfair labor practice. It was challenging the authority of the officials assigned to decide that question.

The Third Circuit nevertheless found a direct connection between the constitutional lawsuit and the labor dispute. The employer would not have filed the federal action but for the NLRB complaint arising from its disagreement with the union. Moreover, stopping the administrative case would prevent the tribunal selected by Congress from resolving the underlying bargaining allegations.

For the majority, that connection was enough. A lawsuit need not duplicate the underlying labor controversy to “grow out of” it. Otherwise, parties could avoid the Norris-LaGuardia Act with some creative caption writing and a fresh coat of constitutional paint.

Why the Requested Injunction Mattered

The court also considered the practical effect of the requested relief. An injunction would not merely preserve an abstract constitutional question for later review. It would immediately halt the agency proceeding in which the union was attempting to enforce collective bargaining rights.

That would give Spring Creek a significant procedural advantage in the underlying labor conflict. The Third Circuit reasoned that placing such a judicial “thumb on the scale” was precisely the type of federal interference in labor relations that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed to limit.

The court recognized exceptions associated with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and with the need to reconcile the Norris-LaGuardia Act with other federal statutes. Neither exception helped Spring Creek. Its request did not involve arbitration, and its constitutional challenge did not depend on a conflicting federal statute that required immediate injunctive relief.

The Third Circuit Split with the Fifth Circuit

The most consequential part of the ruling may be its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s 2025 decision in Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB. That consolidated case involved SpaceX and other employers seeking to halt NLRB proceedings on constitutional grounds.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not block jurisdiction because the federal lawsuits were between the employers and the NLRB, rather than between the employers and their workers or unions. It also concluded that the challenged removal protections were likely unconstitutional and allowed preliminary injunctions against the agency proceedings to remain in place.

The Third Circuit rejected that narrower reading. It explained that Congress could have excluded every lawsuit against the NLRB from the Norris-LaGuardia Act but did not do so. The statute asks whether a case involves or grows out of a labor dispute, not merely whether the caption lists a union or an employee as the defendant.

This difference is not a minor academic disagreement suitable only for a law-school exam and an alarming quantity of coffee. It can determine whether an employer must continue through an NLRB proceeding or may stop the case immediately while pursuing a separate constitutional lawsuit.

The Concurrence Identified Another Obstacle

Judge Cheryl Ann Krause Montgomery-Reeves agreed that Spring Creek’s claims should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but she relied on Article III standing rather than the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

Her concurrence reasoned that Spring Creek had not shown an injury in fact caused by the challenged removal protections. The mere possibility that an ALJ enjoyed unconstitutional tenure protection did not establish that those protections had affected the employer’s case.

For example, Spring Creek had not alleged that the president wanted to remove the particular decision-maker but was prevented from doing so. It also had not identified a concrete action that would have changed if the removal restrictions did not exist.

The concurrence therefore offers employers another warning: even where the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not control, a constitutional challenge may fail unless the employer demonstrates a present and specific injury. An objection to an agency’s organizational chart does not automatically produce irreparable harm.

Later Decisions Expanded the Judicial Divide

The Third Circuit did not remain alone for long. In December 2025, the Ninth Circuit considered Amazon’s attempt to halt an NLRB case involving delivery drivers and the Teamsters. Amazon argued that the Board’s structure and administrative process were unconstitutional.

The Ninth Circuit aligned with the Third Circuit. It held that the federal lawsuit grew out of an underlying labor dispute even though Amazon’s claims focused on constitutional structure. The pending court case did not itself need to be a conventional disagreement about employment terms; it only needed a sufficient connection to the underlying labor controversy.

The Second Circuit took a different procedural route in Care One, LLC v. NLRB. It considered an employer’s constitutional objections but affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction because the employer could not show irreparable harm. The challenged ALJ had completed the relevant proceedings, and the Board could conduct its own review.

The resulting map is complicated. The Third and Ninth Circuits treat the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a jurisdictional barrier in these circumstances. The Fifth Circuit permits injunctions and has viewed the structural constitutional claims favorably. The Second Circuit reached the injunction factors and denied relief for lack of irreparable harm.

Such differences increase the likelihood of eventual Supreme Court review. Federal statutory jurisdiction and the constitutional structure of a national agency should not ordinarily depend on which side of a circuit boundary a company happens to occupy.

What the Decision Means for Employers

The Third Circuit covers Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Employers operating there should not assume that a separate federal lawsuit will pause an NLRB unfair labor practice proceeding.

The decision does not prevent an employer from raising constitutional objections altogether. A company can preserve those arguments during the administrative process and later present them when seeking appellate review of a final Board order. What Spring Creek restricts is the use of an injunction to stop the proceeding before the agency has completed its work.

Preserve Every Important Defense

An employer that believes the NLRB process is constitutionally defective should place that objection clearly in the administrative record. Failing to preserve an argument may create procedural problems when the dispute eventually reaches a federal court of appeals.

At the same time, constitutional litigation should not distract management from the underlying labor case. The company must still respond to the complaint, preserve evidence, prepare witnesses, address bargaining-history questions, and evaluate settlement possibilities. A spectacular separation-of-powers brief will not repair missing payroll records or an unprepared supervisor.

Do Not Confuse Two Types of NLRB Injunctions

The Spring Creek decision concerns an employer’s request for an injunction against the NLRB. It should not be confused with a Section 10(j) injunction, which the NLRB itself may seek in federal court to obtain temporary relief while an unfair labor practice case remains pending.

In 2024, the Supreme Court held in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney that courts evaluating Section 10(j) petitions must apply the traditional four-factor preliminary-injunction test. Both subjects involve injunctions and labor disputes, but the direction of travel is different: one involves an employer trying to stop the Board, while the other involves the Board asking a court to restrain an employer or union.

Broader Constitutional Stakes

The litigation reflects a larger debate over the independence of federal administrative agencies. Supporters of removal protections argue that independent adjudicators need insulation from political pressure. Without such protections, an administration might remove decision-makers merely because it dislikes their rulings.

Critics respond that officials exercising substantial executive power must remain accountable to the president. In their view, layered tenure protections can place important government actors beyond meaningful democratic control.

The Third Circuit avoided choosing between those positions. Its ruling was about jurisdiction, not a final endorsement of the NLRB’s structure. That distinction is crucial. Saying that a court cannot issue a particular injunction is not the same as declaring the underlying agency arrangement constitutional.

Practical Experience and Lessons from Similar NLRB Disputes

Experience with administrative labor cases shows that the opening procedural strategy often shapes the entire dispute. Employers sometimes view a federal constitutional lawsuit as a clean alternative to the slower NLRB process. Spring Creek demonstrates why that assumption can be expensive. A company may devote months to emergency motions and appellate briefing only to learn that the court lacks power to grant the requested relief.

The first practical lesson is to build parallel plans. Counsel can preserve structural constitutional objections while simultaneously preparing to litigate the unfair labor practice complaint. Treating the injunction request as the only plan is risky, especially in the Third and Ninth Circuits. The administrative hearing may proceed on schedule regardless of what happens in district court.

Consider a hypothetical company that purchases a unionized facility and changes work schedules immediately after the acquisition. The union files a refusal-to-bargain charge, and the NLRB schedules a hearing. Management may believe that a constitutional challenge will postpone witness preparation. Under Spring Creek, that belief could produce a nasty calendar surprise. The hearing may continue while the federal action is dismissed, leaving the company to prepare testimony at sprint speed.

The second lesson is to separate litigation goals from business goals. A constitutional challenge may address presidential control over the NLRB, but it does not answer whether bargaining could reduce operational uncertainty. Employers should still examine whether an interim agreement, information exchange, or carefully structured negotiation could resolve part of the dispute. Litigation and labor relations occupy the same building, but they do not always use the same elevator.

The third lesson involves documentation. Successor-employer controversies frequently turn on what the buyer knew, when operational decisions were made, whether the workforce remained substantially continuous, and how the new owner communicated with the union. Transaction records, staffing plans, emails, meeting notes, and bargaining correspondence can become central evidence. A constitutional argument does not make those documents less important.

The fourth lesson is geographic. A business operating in several states may encounter different procedural rules depending on the appellate circuit. That does not mean companies should manufacture jurisdiction or race opponents to a preferred courthouse. It means national employers need coordinated legal strategies that account for conflicting precedent without creating inconsistent factual positions.

Finally, employers should communicate realistic expectations to executives. An injunction is extraordinary relief, not a guaranteed pause button. Senior leaders should understand the possible outcomes, legal expense, public-relations consequences, employee reactions, and effect on ongoing bargaining. A sensible briefing should include what happens if the injunction is granted, denied, delayed, or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The most durable approach is therefore less dramatic than a courthouse showdown: preserve constitutional objections, comply with procedural deadlines, develop the factual record, evaluate settlement opportunities, and prepare for appellate review. It may not produce an exciting movie trailer, but it gives the organization more than one path forward.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s Spring Creek ruling places a formidable jurisdictional barrier in front of employers seeking to enjoin ongoing NLRB proceedings. Because the company’s constitutional lawsuit would not have existed without the underlying collective bargaining dispute, the court held that the case grew out of a labor dispute covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

The decision leaves the constitutional merits unresolved while deepening a nationwide circuit split. The Fifth Circuit has allowed comparable injunctions, the Ninth Circuit has followed the Third Circuit’s jurisdictional approach, and the Second Circuit has denied relief based on the absence of irreparable harm.

Until the Supreme Court or Congress provides a uniform answer, employers must navigate a legal landscape in which venue can dramatically affect the availability of immediate relief. In the Third Circuit, the safer assumption is that the NLRB case will keep moving. Employers should preserve their constitutional claims, but they should also arrive ready to litigate the labor dispute itself.

Note: This article provides general legal information and analysis. It does not constitute legal advice for any particular employer, employee, union, or pending proceeding.